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Abstract 
 This paper presents promising methodologies for modeling and quantifying non-
tariff barriers (NTB) to trade in the agricultural and food sectors. We limit the analysis to 
sanitary, phytosanitary, and technical regulations that can have an impact on trade and to 
methods that provide some quantitative estimates of the impact of such barriers on 
market equilibrium, trade flows, economic efficiency, and welfare. Given the 
heterogeneous nature of these regulations, a unifying methodology does not exist. 
Quantification of the effects of such measures has focused on a particular product and has 
relied on methods that belong to different fields of the economic literature. We provide a 
concise description and evaluation of the various methods available for a more 
comprehensive assessment of the impact of NTBs on trade and welfare. We conclude by 
identifying promising areas for future applied research. 
 
Key words: agriculture, non-tariff barriers, NTB, policy, sanitary and phytosanitary, 
SPS, TBT, technical barriers to trade, trade. 
 
  
 
 
 
QUANTIFICATION OF SANITARY, PHYTOSANITARY, AND 
TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE FOR TRADE POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
 
Introduction 
 The goal of this paper is to present promising methodologies to model and quantify 
non-tariff barriers (NTB) to trade in the agricultural and food sectors. We limit the 
analysis to sanitary, phytosanitary, and technical regulations that can have an impact on 
trade. We focus on methods that provide some quantitative estimates of the impact of 
such barriers on market equilibrium, trade flows, economic efficiency, and welfare. 
Given the heterogeneous nature of these regulations, a unifying methodology does not 
exist. Attempts to quantify the effects of such measures have often focused on a 
particular product and have relied on methods that belong to different fields of the 
economic literature. We provide a concise description and evaluation of the various 
methods available for a more comprehensive assessment of the impact of NTBs on trade 
and welfare. We conclude by identifying promising areas for future applied research. 
 The demand for better estimates of the impact of these regulations on trade matches 
several preoccupations of policymakers. First, domestic regulations may constitute major 
trade impediments, and their use is proliferating. However, it may be that these NTBs are 
simply becoming more visible because of international scrutiny, or more trade restrictive 
because of the decrease in tariffs. A comprehensive assessment of the actual impact of 
these regulations is necessary in order to address the role to be given to non-tariff 
instruments and barriers in a future trade agreement. Second, quantification of the 
economic effects of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical regulations 
is an important step in the regulatory reform process that Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have been involved in since 1997 
(OECD 1997). Quantitative analyses help to inform governments of the costs of their SPS 
policies and provide the tools necessary to define more efficient regulations (Antle 1995). 
Third, more satisfactory techniques for estimating damages to trade partners caused by 
foreign regulations may help solve disputes and serve as a basis for calculating 
2 / Beghin and Bureau 
compensation claims. Finally, sectoral studies suggest that technical regulations in 
developed countries constitute a considerable obstacle to agricultural food and exports of 
developing countries (Cato and Lima dos Santos 1998; Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh 
2000). During the Uruguay Round, developing countries saw access to northern markets 
in the food sector as a main motivation for participating in multilateral agreements, where 
they felt they had otherwise a lot to lose (e.g., on intellectual property). Because they feel 
that their access to northern markets did not improve because of technical requirements, 
they see little interest in participating in a new round of trade negotiations. More 
information on the effect of regulatory barriers could help account for developing 
countries’ claims, a key condition for successful multilateral negotiations. 
 Several recent papers have surveyed policy-relevant issues in the sanitary and 
phytosanitary area (OECD 1999a; Orden and Roberts 1997). Government agencies have 
listed regulations that they see as illegitimate obstacles to exports (EU Commission 2000; 
USTR 2001). Researchers have proposed various definitions of NTBs and have tried to 
distinguish between those regulations designed to protect local industry and those 
designed to protect consumers (Hillman 1997; Roberts and DeRemer 1997). The 
legitimacy of such regulations has been discussed, as well as the rationale behind purely 
science based versus economic approaches (Neven 2000; James and Anderson 1998; 
Bureau and Marette 2000). Frameworks for estimating the effects of such barriers have 
also been proposed (Bigsby and Whyte 2000; Roberts, Josling, and Orden 1999; Maskus 
and Wilson 2000; Maskus, Wilson, and Otsuki 2001; Ganslandt and Markusen 2000). 
However, a lot of work remains to be done on quantitative estimates of the impact of 
regulations on trade. 
 
Definitions of a Non-trade Barrier 
Different Conceptions of a Non-trade Barrier  
 Hillman (1991) defines NTBs as “Any governmental device or practice other than a 
tariff which directly impedes the entry of imports into a country and which discriminates 
against imports, but does not apply with equal force on domestic production or 
distribution.” Thornsbury et al. (1999) endorse this concept. Their definition includes 
standards of identity, measure, and quality, SPS measures, and packaging measures. 
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Roberts (1998) and Thornbury (1998) have classified regulations by policy instrument, 
by scope of the barrier, by regulatory goal, by legal discipline, by type of market 
restriction, by product category, and by geographical region. Such a classification helps 
to identify differences in food safety and quality standards among counties that could 
have protectionist tendencies.  
 However, distinguishing an NTB from a legitimate regulation for protecting 
consumers can be difficult. That is why other authors emphasize that the term “barrier” 
should not be applied to measures that may have an incidental effect of restricting trade 
but whose principal objective is to correct market inefficiencies. On the basis of a 
definition of NTBs given by Baldwin (1970), who restricted the concept to measures that 
decrease world global revenue, trade-restricting regulations that have overall positive 
welfare effects should not be considered NTBs. Mahé’s (1997) definition of an NTB as a 
restriction other than a tariff that leads to a decrease in world welfare falls into this 
category. The idea of qualifying as protectionist a standard that differs from the one that 
would be chosen by a world-welfare-maximizing social planner also relies on the same 
idea. Other authors suggest using cost-benefit criteria to decide whether regulations that 
affect trade are legitimate.1 
 A third definition of NTBs relies on the idea that a regulatory measure should be 
compared to the measure that would have been implemented if it had been designed for 
domestic purposes only (Maskus, Wilson, and Otsuki 2001). Fisher and Serra (2000), for 
example, characterize a standard (in an open economy) as non-protectionist if it 
corresponds to the standard that the social planer would use if all firms were domestic. 
This makes it possible to account for the welfare-enhancing effect of a standard in the 
presence of negative externalities. 
Consequences for Measurement  
 The distinction between a trade-oriented definition and a welfare-oriented definition 
of an NTB is not just theoretical. It has direct consequences on empirical measurement, 
because the two conceptions lead to different approaches. Some methods rely on the 
measurement of possible trade impacts only (such as methods based on price-wedge 
estimation, surveys, and gravity models). Other methods are grounded in welfare 
economics and measure NTBs through a larger range of effects than trade alone (such as 
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methods based on comparative-statics or cost-benefit analysis and general equilibrium 
analysis). Welfare-based approaches are conceptually superior because they capture a 
larger range of effects (e.g., they account for the positive externality of a regulation that, 
say, protects consumers). However, because NTBs are debated in multilateral 
negotiations, negotiators focus on trade expansion, measuring the impact in terms of 
volume of trade for other countries. 
 
An Analytical Framework for Measurement 
Measurement 
 Measurement in economics attempts to capture complex effects into one scalar. One 
possibility is to measure NTBs through their synthetic effect on the volume of imports at 
world prices. More general effects can be taken into account by assessing the effect of 
NTBs on welfare, which is the most synthetic indicator of the effects of a given measure on 
a whole economy. To account for the revenue that is diverted between different agents, 
distributional effects of NTBs must be taken into account, for example, by using a social 
accounting matrix that represents the effect on different categories of agents. General 
measures can also be based on the resource costs of NTBs. In such a case, the measure 
would include not only the deadweight losses but also the administrative costs of enforcing 
NTBs and the costs of the resources lost to rent seeking (Deardorff and Stern 1998). 
 Measures of NTBs can be based on how a given regulation affects the overall 
equilibrium in the sector or in the economy. Roberts, Josling, and Orden (1999) propose 
an analytical framework for analyzing NTBs that summarizes most of what the various 
authors have adopted. They distinguish three economic effects: (i) the “regulatory 
protection effect,” i.e., the fact that a regulation provides some rents to the domestic 
sector; (ii) the “supply shift” effect, which focuses on the effects of imports on the 
domestic supply and the costs of enforcing compliance; and (iii) the “demand-shift” 
effect, which takes into account the fact that a regulation may bring information and 
increase consumer demand for the product. Using comparative statics in a partial 
equilibrium framework, the authors illustrate the different effects of these three 
components of NTBs, in particular in terms of welfare. 
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 Compliance with a regulation involves a cost to foreign suppliers, which acts like a 
trade tax, resulting in a deadweight loss in the importing country as well as transfers from 
consumers to producers. Because there is no tariff revenue, the welfare loss is potentially 
higher than with the tariff equivalent. This shows that all the methods relying on the 
construction of a tariff equivalent (described in some of the following sections, such as 
the price-wedge method) are only appropriate for measuring trade volume effects but do 
not give a tariff equivalent that has welfare interpretations.  
 The supply-shifts component of an NTB captures both the effect of imports on the 
domestic supply (in the absence of regulation) and the potentially beneficial impact of the 
regulation, should it limit the cost of pathogens for example (even if this involves some 
additional costs of testing and detection). Other features can be added to the framework 
proposed by Roberts, Josling, and Orden (1999). In particular, the cost of regulations 
affects small and large firms differently, and regulations modify the structure of 
competition or the size of the relative markets, affecting markups and rents (Neven 2000; 
Fisher and Serra 2000). Ganslandt and Markusen (2000) also account for the fact that 
standards can impose a fixed cost of entry that affects competition and may also lead to 
multiple equilibria, an effect well known in the literature on industrial organization. 
Maskus, Wilson, and Otsuki (2001) account for the discriminatory nature of the 
regulation towards imported products through relative shifts in the excess supply curve of 
the exporting country and excess demand curves of the importing country.  
 Finally, the regulation affects domestic demand. This, as well as possible shifts in 
supply, opens the possibility for the regulation to generate welfare gains that could offset, 
at least partially, the losses involved in the “regulatory protection” effect. The large 
literature derived from industrial organization has made it possible to account for effects 
more sophisticated than the simple shift in supply curves. Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina 
(1998), for example, specifically include the information aspect in the “demand shift” 
effect. The regulation brings information and therefore avoids the “lemon problem,” or 
reduces the cost that consumers face in assessing product quality. Casella (1996), and 
Fisher and Serra (2000) explicitly account for the public good effect of regulations. It is 
also possible to include the reduction of transaction costs induced by some regulations 
and standards. The analytical frameworks proposed by Roberts, Josling, and Orden 
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(1999) can be extended to the multimarket case, which makes it possible to include extra 
effects of regulations. These include the fact that regulations (at least those that promote 
standards) can raise the elasticity of substitution in demand and bring network 
externalities and even economies of scale by permitting producers to settle on a limited 
range of product characteristics or processes, or other forms of transaction facilitation 
(Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr 1996; Maskus, Wilson, and Otsuki 2001).  
Practical Obstacles to Measurement 
 There is, however, still a large gap between the ambitious analytical framework and 
the applied estimates of the effects of NTBs. In practice, the way regulations affect supply, 
the extra costs induced, and the price differences between foreign and domestic products 
are key components of model simulations. Information on these aspects is still incomplete. 
Even when it is possible to observe what actually occurs as a result of the NTB, this does 
not in itself measure only the NTB but captures other information, for example the supply 
elasticity.2 The sophisticated effects of extra information and trade facilitation addressed in 
stylized microeconomic models are hard to quantify. The impact of standards on 
consumers’ confidence and willingness to pay, for example for credence attributes (genetic 
engineering, ethical, animal welfare, or environmental attributes) remain uncertain. While 
in theory, applied general equilibrium (GE) models are able to account for the complex 
effects of regulations on trade, in practice, many simulations rely on crude estimates at an 
aggregated level. Most of the time, the results are questionable. In the next sections, we 
turn to a description and a brief assessment of the various methods that have been used in 
the empirical estimation of the effect of non-trade barriers. 
  
The Price-Wedge Method 
Principle  
 Price-wedge methods rely on the idea that NTBs can be gauged in terms of their 
impact on the domestic price in comparison to a reference price. The main use of this 
method is to provide a tariff equivalent. That is, the method is conceptually oriented 
toward measuring the trade impact of NTBs. However, the estimate of the price wedge 
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(or the tariff equivalent) can be used as an input in a partial or even a general equilibrium 
model that focuses more on the welfare effect of NTBs. 
 The tariff equivalent is estimated by calculating the price wedge between the 
imported good and the comparable product in the domestic market. The correct measure 
would be to compare the price that would prevail without the NTB to the price that would 
prevail domestically in the presence of the NTB if the price paid to suppliers were to 
remain unchanged (Deardorff and Stern 1998). However, these prices usually are 
unobservable, and actual measures focus instead on a comparison of the domestic and 
foreign price in the presence of the NTB. Adjustment can be made for retrieving the price 
situation in the absence of an NTB using trading quantities and supply and demand 
elasticities of domestic and imported goods (Laird and Yeats 1990).  
 The domestic price of the imported good should be compared with the invoice price, 
i.e., the cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) price of the imported good as paid by the 
domestic importer to the foreign exporter, inclusive of transport costs but exclusive of 
tariffs. If this price is not available, it is possible to use alternative measures such as the 
price of imports taken from a variety of exporters (although Deardorff and Stern 1998 
provide evidence of possible bias when this convention is used). The tariff equivalent of a 
regulation can be measured as a residue when the price difference is corrected for tariff, 
handling, and transportation costs and for product quality differences.  
Existing Studies 
 Such a method was used by Campbell and Gossette (1994) for a large number of 
sectors, including food and agriculture. They made sophisticated quality adjustments to 
make products homogenous. The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) uses the 
method on a regular basis. The USITC measures the price gap of U.S. tariff equivalents 
by sector and also adjusts for quality differences (USITC 1995). The method was used in 
two studies specific to the agriculture and food sector. Calvin and Krissoff (1998) 
estimated the tariff rate equivalents of the technical regulations in the apple sector. In 
order to do so, they compared CIF prices (landed prices including freight and insurance 
costs) of U.S. apples in a foreign country with wholesale prices in the foreign market. 
They assumed that the price gap consists of the tariff and technical barrier tariff rate 
equivalent. They used monthly data, and attempted to focus as much as possible on the 
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price of a like apple (i.e., same variety, grade, and size) during the same time and at a 
similar place in the marketing chain. They constructed transport costs that correspond to 
the cost of bringing U.S. apples to various wholesale markets. Once the difference in 
price between the U.S. apple delivered in the foreign country and the wholesale price for 
a similar apple in the foreign wholesale market was known, the monthly price wedge (in 
percentage terms) was calculated. The monthly price wedge was divided into the known 
tariff rate and the technical barrier tariff rate equivalent, which was the residual.  
 This approach was also used in a study for the European Commission that compared 
monthly CIF prices of U.S. pig and poultry meat as well as apples in the European Union 
(EU) with their wholesale price in the EU market (European Commission 2001). The 
difference in price between the U.S. product and the wholesale price of the comparable 
product was calculated as the price wedge in percentage terms. Within the same EU-
sponsored project, a similar approach was implemented for the measurement of U.S. non-
tariff barriers in tomatoes and apples. While Calvin and Krissoff’s (1998) study leads to 
the conclusion that the price-wedge method can provide useful estimates of the tariff 
equivalent of technical barriers, the authors of the EU study are pessimistic about the 
practical validity of the method. In the case of tomatoes, their results are highly sensitive 
to the choice of a price series. Export prices show considerable variations over time and 
across various origins, and quality effects cannot explain this fact. The importance of the 
efficiency of the marketing channels of existing relations is such that, for commodities 
like tomatoes, results were not reliable. Even with a relatively narrow list of 
commodities, there are quality differences that might affect the measure of NTB tariff 
equivalent as a price-wedge residual. Calvin and Krissoff, for example, acknowledge 
that, in spite of their efforts to use like products, South Korean Fuji apples are different 
from Extra Fancy Washington apples. 
Practical Validity of the Method  
 The price-wedge method has several limitations. First, the method makes it possible 
to quantify the effect of a set of NTBs present on the market but seldom makes it possible 
to identify what those NTBs are precisely. Second, formulas that measure the NTB in an 
implicit way, as a percentage price wedge between imports and domestic prices, are valid 
only under the assumption that imported goods are perfect substitutes. A barrier that 
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raises the domestic price of an import good by 10 percent raises its price in the domestic 
market by less than that if imports are a small part of the market and if imports are a poor 
substitute for domestic goods. That is, comparisons between a good’s domestic and 
international prices can be biased by cross-country differences in supply and demand 
elasticity. Price can also be affected by differences in the ability of foreign and domestic 
firms to appropriate rents from non-tariff restrictions. If exporting firms are able to price 
discriminate, the price-wedge method will also reflect rents rather than NTBs. 
 The main limitation of the method lies in its practical difficulties. For large-scale 
studies, available data are often too aggregated to reflect differences in the quality of 
imported goods. Even when prices can be observed at the border of the importing 
country, inclusive of international transportation costs, price differential calculations do 
not fully reflect the transaction costs of moving goods from the border to wholesale 
markets. Traded products are different from the domestic ones in some aspects. If 
domestic varieties are of a higher quality than imports, such measures find protection 
even where there is none. 
 Overall, because of data limitations, the analysis can only be performed successfully 
on a few case studies, focusing on a particular product that is relatively standardized. For 
larger-scale studies, the price-wedge method does not appear reliable. Particularly 
questionable are the (numerous) studies where crude estimates of tariff equivalents of 
regulatory measures using the price-wedge method have been introduced in large-scale 
models. The price-wedge method applied to a level of detail such as the two-digit level of 
the Harmonized System or the Standard Global Trade Analysis Project classification is 
unlikely to reflect the true effect of technical regulations but will instead capture many 
other unwanted effects.  
 
Inventory-Based Approaches 
Principle  
 Inventory-based approaches can be used both in a quantitative perspective as well as in 
a qualitative perspective to assess the importance of domestic regulations as trade barriers. 
Three sources of information can be used: (i) data on regulations, such as the number of 
regulations, which can be used to construct various statistical indicators, or proxy variables, 
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such as the number of pages of national regulations; (ii) data on frequency of detentions; 
and (iii) data on complaints from the industry against discriminatory regulatory practices 
and notifications to international bodies about such practices. 
 Quantitative estimates can rely on the catalog of all technical barriers (identification 
and description) based on data sets that list the various regulations in the sanitary, 
phytosanitary, and technical area.3 Simple statistics, such are frequency-type measures, 
can be used to provide an indication of the frequency of occurrence of NTBs. Such 
measures may be unweighted or they may be weighted by imports of by production. 
Measures include (i) the number of restrictions; (ii) frequency ratios (the number of 
product categories subject to an NTB as a percentage of the total number of product 
category in the classification); and (iii) the import coverage ratio, constructed as the value 
of imports of each commodity subject to an NTB, as a percentage of imports in the 
corresponding product category. More refined indicators can provide some extra 
information, albeit under somewhat tenuous assumptions. For example, the percentage of 
standards based on international ones can be an indication of the overall compliance of a 
national standard with widely used international standards.4 
 Data on detentions at the border is also a relevant source of information. In the 
United States, data are readily available on border inspection, reasons for detention, and 
the frequency of rejected shipments for technical, sanitary, and phytosanitary reasons. 
Existing Studies 
 The inventory-based approach has recently gained momentum, and two studies have 
related trade flows to measures of a country’s stock of standards. Swann, Temple, and 
Shurmer (1996) used counts of voluntary national and international standards recognized 
by the United Kingdom and Germany in an econometric study, where the authors 
regressed British net exports, exports, and imports over the period 1985–1991 on 
variables including frequency indicators of standards. Moenius (1999) also used the 
inventory-based method as an input in econometric approaches. Both studies used counts 
of binding standards in a given industry as a measure of stringency of standards. Otsuki, 
Wilson, and Sewadeh (2000) went further and employed a direct measure of the severity 
of food safety standards expressed in maximum allowable contamination. Fontagné, von 
Kirchbach, and Mimouni (2001) used a more sophisticated indicator for assessing the 
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impact of environmental regulations and their potential use as a trade barrier. The 
underlying idea is that when a barrier is set by only a limited number of countries, it is 
more likely to be used for protectionist purposes. Employing  a large dataset, they used 
frequency statistics with different thresholds on the number of countries that have 
implemented a trade-restrictive regulation for a given product. 
 In their study on the food sector for the European Commission, Henson, Lux, and 
Traill (2001) used several approaches to assess the importance of regulatory obstacles in 
the European Union and the United States, including the inventory approach. They 
compared the regulatory food quality and safety regimes of the European Union and the 
United States and identified differences in food quality and safety standards by 
classifying these measures by policy instruments and regulatory goal or aim. They used a 
database of mandatory governmental regulations and standards from the United States 
(447 regulations published in the Code of Federal Regulation) and the European Union 
(279 regulations published in the European Official Journal).  
 Other studies have used data on border detention rather than regulations. For 
example, Lux and Henson (2000) have performed an analysis of border detentions in the 
United States in order to assess how EU exports could be harmed by import procedures 
and border inspection. Their analysis shows that problems mainly arise in specific 
sectors, such as dairy. Henson et al. (2000) have studied the import rejections by the 
United States of products coming from Africa, Asia, and Latin America because of 
sanitary and technical reasons. 
Practical Validity of the Method 
 Standards vary in importance across sectors and products. Different standards would 
not be expected to have similar effects, and the number of standards or the number of pages 
of domestic regulations is a poor proxy for the trade restrictiveness of the whole regulatory 
set. It is not clear if there is any correlation between the number of measures and the effect 
on trade. When based on international data sets, estimates based on the occurrence of the 
measure can also be misleading because of the uneven reporting by countries and the non-
uniform coverage of measures across countries. Measures based on actual detention at the 
border are more reliable but run into the limited availability of data. With the exception of 
the United States, countries do not make information readily available. 
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 With these limitations, inventory-based approaches can be useful for directing 
attention to the frequency of occurrence and the trade or production coverage of various 
types of NTBs. Inventory-based methods do not really provide a quantification of the 
effect of regulations on trade per se. However, they can provide useful indications on the 
importance of the problem and on which sectors’ and countries’ NTBs are more likely to 
be found. An interesting use of this method is the construction of indicators that can be 
used in econometric estimates of trade. Their use as a proxy variable in econometric 
models (e.g., gravity models) is a method of research that deserves more exploration. 
 
Survey-Based Approaches 
Principle 
 Inventory-based approaches do not make it possible to differentiate between 
regulations that have a major trade restriction effect and those that do not. By asking 
practitioners which measures have more impact on their activity, surveys make it possible 
to narrow the scope of the analysis and to focus on the relevant issues. When coupled 
with in-depth interviews of a sample of the population surveyed, these approaches have 
sometimes provided counterintuitive assessments of the importance of trade barriers.  
 Surveys can also be designed to provide information (such as ranking the importance 
of the measures on a scale) that can be used in econometric studies. An extensive study 
conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) on estimates of the trade 
impact of foreign technical regulations illustrates interest in the method when basic 
information is missing . The econometric exploitation of the USDA survey shows that 
surveys can be used as a basis for more refined measures of NTBs (Thornsbury 1998). 
Existing Studies 
 Information provided by the industries that face restrictions to their exports is an 
input for the European Commission’s annual report on U.S. trade barriers (2000) and the 
U.S. Trade Representative’s annual report on foreign trade barriers (USTR 2001). In 
some areas (the information technology industry in particular), the U.S. International 
Trade Commission also performs informal interviews of corporate executives, officers of 
Quantification of Sanitary, Phytosanitary, and Technical Barriers to Trade / 13 
trade associations, and government officials for their reviews of the importance of 
standards as trade impediments.  
 The OECD (1999b) conducted a survey of 55 firms in three sectors in the United 
States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany on exports impediments. One of the 
sectors surveyed was the dairy industry. In 1996, the USDA conducted a survey 
providing a cross-sectional accounting of technical barriers to U.S. agricultural exports. 
The USDA cross-sectional data set was used to characterize the extent of economic-based 
protection provided. Several studies derived from this survey quantified the trade impact 
of questionable technical barriers on U.S. agricultural exports (Roberts and DeRemer 
1997; Thornsbury et al. 1999; and Thornsbury 1998).  
 Specific surveys were conducted concerning the problems developing countries face 
in meeting the SPS requirements of the developed countries and adhering to the 
provisions of the SPS agreement. Henson, Loader, and Swinbank (1999) conducted 
surveys (by fax) coupled with in-depth interviews. The questionnaires were sent to 
contact points (e.g., the contact point of the Codex Alimentarius in a given country) in 
developing countries rather than to industry representatives. Several studies conducted by 
the University of Reading used a combination of surveys and in-depth interviews. This 
approach proved particularly interesting for identifying the most relevant issues and for 
debunking some common misconceptions. For example, from the work of Henson, Lux, 
and Traill (2001) for the European Commission, it appears that one major complaint of 
European exporters to the United States is not the tariff or the sanitary requirements but 
the administrative burden, in terms of both delays and lack of predictability.5 A finding of 
the OECD (1999b) survey on dairy was that few firms considered standards to be of great 
concern. In the dairy industry, there were problems in certification and approval delays 
for exporters of specialty products, but dealers in bulk dairy goods reported few 
difficulties.  
Practical Validity of the Method 
 Survey-based methods are useful when other sources of information are lacking. 
Combined with interviews, they also have shed considerable light on the important issue 
of barriers faced by developing countries willing to export to the United States and to the 
European Union, for example. Another useful feature of the survey-based approaches is 
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the ability to identify barriers that are diffuse and difficult to measure, such as the 
administrative ones. Survey-based methods also show that the regulations of greater 
concern for the industry are not always those that economists would have identified and 
attempted to include in their models.  
 However, the ability of surveys to actually help quantifying NTBs is questionable. 
The firms consulted are likely to be biased if there is a perception that the agency 
conducting the survey will use the information for policy purposes. Even the experts 
surveyed can have the perception that their responses could be used to initiate dispute-
settlement procedures.6 The definition of the questionnaire and the way the survey is 
conducted are likely to affect the NTB estimate. The cost of the method, in view of the 
results, suggests that it should be restricted to cases where no other sources of 
information are available. 
 
Gravity-Based Approaches 
Principle 
 When trying to quantify NTBs, an obvious technique is to consider the foregone 
trade that cannot be explained by tariffs. A typical approach is to look at the residuals in 
economic regressions of trade flows on the various determinants of trade. In these 
approaches, gravity models are of particular interest since they have long been used as a 
way to estimate the “home bias” or the “border effect” in trade, a part of it reflecting 
national regulations that hamper trade. The basic principles of gravity models are 
summarized by Head (2000). Gravity models rely on Newton’s “Law of Universal 
Gravitation” formula, which holds that the attractive force Fij between two objects i and j 
is given by Fij = G*(Mi*Mj)/Dij2, where Mi and Mj are the masses, Dij is the distance 
between the two objects and G is a gravitational constant. In a similar way, economists 
discovered in the 1960s that the equation Fij = G*(Mia*Mjb)/Dij2 performed well at 
explaining trade flows if Fij is the “flow” from origin i to destination j; Mi and Mj are the 
relevant economic sizes of the two locations; Dij is the distance between the locations; 
and G, a, and b are constant (G, a, and b have subsequently been related to the form of 
economic functions). For a long time, gravity models performed relatively well but 
lacked theoretical foundations. However, Anderson (1979) gave a theoretical foundation 
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of the model in the presence of imperfect substitutability between goods, and further 
developments have shown that the gravity equation was consistent with situations 
characterized by monopolistic competition (Bergstrand 1989; Deardorff 1998). This 
foundation, together with new developments in this approach, has renewed interest in the 
method (Hummels 2000; Anderson and van Wincoop 2001). 
 An interesting application of the method estimates how much trade is foregone 
because of the “border” effect only. For example, McCallum (1995) showed that in 1988 
the U.S.-Canadian border showed an effect that, all things being equal (in particular, 
distances and costs), intra-Canadian province trade was 22 times higher than transborder 
trade. Since that study, numerous attempts have been made to include some explanatory 
variables in the analysis, including language, indicators of “remoteness,” and cultural 
differences. Dummy variables have been introduced to deal with various types of local 
characteristics. However, administrative barriers have seldom been taken explicitly into 
consideration.  
 It seems possible to use information on regulations, for example, estimates using the 
methods described above (number, frequency of regulations, survey-based impacts), or, 
in certain cases, the level of standards themselves, provided that there is some variability 
across countries or over time (e.g., the level of chemical residues, of aflatoxins, of 
antibiotics, etc.) as explanatory variables. Robust methods such as variance analysis or 
principal component analysis applied to the border-effect term could help quantify the 
impact of NTBs on trade. Gravity-based techniques attempt to measure the trade impact 
of NTBs, rather than their welfare impact, and may therefore ignore some of the effect of 
the regulations that correct market failures but restrict trade. However, the sign of the 
variables that capture the NTB effect in the regression is not constrained, and it is 
possible to capture also the trade-enhancing effect of regulations when they act as 
standards that facilitate trade. 
Existing Studies 
 A study by Moenius (1999) is one of the most direct attempts to measure the trade 
impact of technical barriers to trade (TBT) using gravity-based analysis of bilateral trade 
volumes. He focused on the trade impact of standards (voluntary norms) rather than on 
regulations due to data limitations. Moenius’s panel covers 471 industries in 12 western 
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European nations from 1980 to 1995. He found that a shared standard has a large trade 
promoting effect between the nations sharing the standard. He incorporated econometric 
refinements (correction for autocorrelation, causality testing, etc.). This makes it possible 
to estimate the impact of a 1 percent increase in the number of bilaterally shared 
standards on bilateral trade volume.  
 In the food and agriculture sector, Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2000) used the 
gravity equation method to explain trade patterns between countries and to determine the 
effect of European aflatoxin standards on African exports. Their results show that new 
(and more stringent) EU standards are likely to be a major barrier to African exports of 
dried fruits and nuts. Although their approach is not characterized by econometric 
refinements, they exploit the possibility of using the level of standard itself as an 
explanatory variable because the aflatoxin maximum residue shows statistical variation in 
their panel. Recently, several gravity equation models have been estimated, focusing on 
the food sector. They might provide a basis for measurement of NTBs (Hillberry 2001; 
Burfisher et al. 2001; Vido and Prentice 2001). 
Practical Validity of the Method 
 The caveats of these approaches is that they attribute departures of trade from what 
the model can explain to a mix of national effects, including NTBs, while the model is 
unlikely to be able to explain correctly all trade flows, even in the absence of domestic 
regulations and other factors entering into the “border effect.” When focusing on detailed 
products and spatial trade flows among given countries, the prediction is likely to be 
sensitive to the assumptions of the models.  
 However, many econometric refinements are possible with this type of approach. 
The method could help sort out the share of the regulations in the “border” effect. It could 
also make it possible to deal with binary variables (allowed or banned) or with discrete 
variables—which often are the only characterization of NTBs—when standards do not 
show enough statistical variability to be used as regressors. Overall, gravity-based 
approaches, coupled with the use of proxy variables from survey- or inventory-based 
methods, are a promising area of research. 
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Risk-Assessment-Based Cost-Benefit Measures 
Principle 
 Risk assessment approaches seem far away from the measurement of NTBs. 
However, these methods have been coupled with cost-benefit calculations and indirectly 
contribute to the measurement of the effect of regulations, and therefore of NTBs. Rather 
than quantifying the actual impact of this measure on trade, they provide some indication 
of what should be included as trade barriers on the basis of the effect of regulations on 
welfare. When SPS regulations aim at correcting market failures, one difficulty often is 
the identification of the protectionist component of the regulation. There are only limited 
cases where the efficiency assessment is straightforward.7 In other cases, comparing the 
costs of compliance to the gains associated with the reduction of an externality, say, the 
prevention of contamination or pest infestation, can help unravel the efficiency and the 
protectionist effect of a regulation. By decomposing the welfare effects, it is possible to 
assess the welfare loss associated with a measure whose costs exceed benefits. This can 
be used to estimate the extent to which this measure qualifies as an NTB. When the 
benefits are found negligible, this approach provides a sufficient test of trade distortion. 
Such estimates can also shed light on the scientific and economic rationale for the 
regulation and therefore help define what regulation would have been implemented if 
there were only domestic firms. This provides a gauge against which present regulations 
could be compared in order to assess the presence of a protectionist component (Fischer 
and Serra 2000).  
Existing Studies 
 Bigsby and Whyte (2000) proposed a way to measure both economic effects and 
probability aspects of risk and developed a methodology in the case of pest infestation. 
James and Anderson (1998) used economic assessment of quarantine regulation. They 
concluded that there is a need for a comprehensive economic review of quarantine 
restrictions to determine those that pass the test of cost-benefit analysis. More generally, 
Arrow et al. (1996) argued for a more systematic use of the cost-benefit analysis in the 
environment and health sectors so as to assess the legitimacy of the regulations that can 
be excessively costly for taxpayers and consumers in view of their actual effect on health 
or the environment. 
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 The USDA analysis of trade policy with Mexico on avocados illustrates that the mix 
of science-based evaluation and cost-benefit analysis can be useful in the estimation of 
NTBs as well as the settlement of SPS trade disputes (Orden and Romano 1996). The 
evaluation of pest risk; the definition of measures that help reduce the risk of spreading 
pests to a low, albeit non-zero, level; and the combination of these assessments with a 
comprehensive evaluation of the potential costs to the benefits, including impact on 
consumers, were pivotal in the analysis. Pest infestation reduces domestic supply, 
generates costs, and affects prices. The economic assessment of a partial ban was tested 
against various probabilities of pest infestation. Overall, this approach showed that the 
U.S. import ban resulted in large transfers to U.S. producers, through higher prices for 
domestic over foreign goods, in order to avoid relatively small potential costs of a pest 
infestation.8 That is, this analysis proved useful in differentiating between the protection 
motive and the legitimate pest avoidance component of the ban. 
Practical Validity of the Method 
 The combined use of scientific and cost-benefit assessment is one of the most 
promising areas of research in the identification and assessment of the effects of NTBs. 
The SPS Agreement pays little attention to economic analysis. Scientific evidence of 
contamination, or spread of a disease through trade, is the relevant criterion (OECD 
1999a). Despite this lack of economic consideration, the idea of including more cost-
benefit analysis in the assessment of NTBs and in the settlement of disputes has 
progressed substantially in international fora. Should this concept translate into giving 
more weight to economics in international agreements in the future, the scope of the cost-
benefit-based method would be even greater. 
 The main limitations of this approach are the great uncertainty that surrounds the 
level of risks and the economic consequences. In the case of sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures, for example, the method requires an assessment of the probability of 
contamination or spread of a disease or of a pest and the associated cost.9 There is also 
little reason for limiting the scope of cost-benefit analysis to sanitary or phytosanitary 
risks. Other regulatory barriers could be addressed with cost-benefit analysis. However, 
the effect of standards on consumers’ willingness to pay is perhaps even more difficult to 
quantify, especially in the case of imaginary risks or in the case of ethical characteristics 
of the goods. 
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Stylized Microeconomic Approaches 
Principle 
 Cost-benefit analysis methods can be refined by accounting for more sophisticated 
effects in an analytical representation of producers and consumers. The effect of NTBs 
can be assessed by looking at the displacement of the market equilibrium induced by a 
regulation. Provided that microeconomic data (preferably cross-section or panel) are 
available, the effect of regulations on supply and demand can be measured by standard 
estimates of cost or profit functions, as well as by utility or demand functions estimated 
econometrically. Duality theorems can be used to estimate a shadow price associated 
with the variable representing a standard or a binding regulation, for example. However, 
the classical framework of price-taking firms and perfectly informed consumers is 
seldom appropriate to assess the effects of regulations on supply and demand. A large 
body of literature, derived from research in industrial economics, has focused on the 
complex effects of regulations and standards. This literature makes it possible to account 
for a variety of effects on competition, information, and economies of scope or scale 
when a regulation is adopted.  
Existing Studies 
 The literature dealing with these issues has remained largely theoretical, and the goal 
has often been to illustrate economic mechanisms at stake rather than providing 
quantitative estimates of the impact of non-tariff barriers. Some authors have included in 
stylized partial equilibrium models the effect of standards on the structure of competition 
between firms (Boom 1995; Crampes and Hollander 1995a). The strategic interactions 
between firms reacting to new regulations has been the topic of many papers (Grossman 
and Horn 1988; Crampes and Hollander 1995b). So has the way regulations modify the 
information available for consumers (Shapiro 1983; Donnenfeld, Weber, and Ben-Zion 
1985). For example, welfare effects of a regulation are different depending on whether 
consumers can or cannot assess the quality of the products, and whether they can do it 
before or after consumption (Marette, Bureau, and Gozlan 2000). It has also been shown 
that regulations may change the costs of signaling quality (Falvey 1989), which may 
result in network externalities and economies of scale (Katz and Shapiro 1985; Barrett 
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and Yang 1999). Because of all these properties, a regulation has complex and sometimes 
opposite effects on prices and welfare.  
Practical Validity of the Method 
 While there is still a gap in the literature between stylized models and large-scale 
quantifications, a fruitful area of research would be to include more sophisticated supply 
and demand equations, with parameters estimated econometrically. This could help to 
assess how much trade is foregone because of regulations, how much consumers 
preferences are affected, and what the effect of harmonization of regulations versus 
mutual recognition agreements might be for particular nations.  
 A major obstacle to quantification of the effect is that the analytical framework that 
makes it possible to account for sophisticated effects becomes rapidly intractable unless 
one makes drastic simplifying assumptions on the shape of demand curves and on 
competition (e.g., duopoly or monopoly competing in prices or quantity). Limiting these 
approaches is their robustness to the simplifying assumptions and their difficulty in 
providing estimates of the various effects. The calibration of the demand functions—the 
response to standards that affect consumers’ willingness to pay, for example—is difficult, 
in particular when one deals with the demand for ethical or environmental attributes. So 
is the displacement of the various equilibria when, for example, the structure of 
competition is modified by standards that act as barriers to entry.  
 However, accounting for imperfect competition, imperfect information, and strategic 
effects often makes it possible to point out some non-intuitive effects of standards on 
trade or welfare. Overall, the industrial organization approach has mainly been useful for 
providing a “toolbox” for integrating competition or informational effect into more 
traditional quantitative approaches, such as partial equilibrium based estimates. 
 
Quantification Using Sectoral or Multi-market Models 
 The distinctions among the previous categories (cost-benefit analysis and 
microeconomic approaches) are quite arbitrary. Partial equilibrium models rely on 
microeconomic representations of supply and demand and are used most often to assess 
the effects of a particular policy on equilibrium, i.e., on the changes in price, quantity, 
and welfare. They are a way to perform cost-benefit analysis. We make this distinction in 
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order to discuss relatively large-scale models with parameters estimated so as to represent 
real life empirical cases, rather than the stylized mechanisms that characterize most of the 
microeconomic approaches previously reviewed. 
Principle 
 Partial equilibrium models provide a framework for analyzing tariff-rate equivalents 
of standards and technical regulations. Their main feature, compared to gravity models, is 
that they make it possible to assess not only the impact of regulations on trade flows but 
also on welfare. Compared to the stylized approaches used in industrial economics that 
focus on qualitative effects, partial equilibrium models provide more quantitative results. 
 Most of the models that quantify the effects of regulations use some of the 
techniques that were presented above (price-gap method, the inventory approach, or the 
risk-based assessment) to provide a more explicit summary of the effect of the 
regulations on production, consumption, trade, and welfare. These effects can be included 
in large-scale models, which most often have focused on classical forms of protection, 
such as tariffs, and whose specification did not make it possible to account for effects of 
regulations. This sometimes requires including some particular specifications, for 
example, imperfect competitions or product differentiation, although in a relatively 
simplified framework (e.g., Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz or Lancaster-based product 
differentiation). Important linkages to other markets are included. 
Existing Studies 
 Partial equilibrium models have been a natural extension of the approaches described 
previously. For example, an explicit specification of supply and demand functions was 
used by Orden and Romano (1996) to assess the costs and benefits of a ban on avocados 
as an extension of their risk-based assessment. Calvin and Krissoff (1998) also combined 
the price-wedge method with a simple partial equilibrium framework (using only 
estimated supply and demand elasticities) when they studied Japanese imports of U.S. 
apples. Paarlberg and Lee (1998) included a risk-based approach to a partial equilibrium 
framework. They studied the case of U.S. tariff protection against beef imports from 
countries that may transmit foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). In their approach, the 
domestic government is assumed to maximize the country’s welfare by setting the 
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optimal tariff rate, where expected loss of domestic beef production due to FMD 
infection in U.S. livestock has been incorporated ex ante into the tariff rate. James and 
Anderson (1998) also included the probability of contamination in a partial equilibrium 
framework in order to assess the costs and benefits of quarantine restrictions. 
 Some studies, however, put more emphasis on economic modeling, and estimate (or 
calibrate) more sophisticated forms of the demand and supply function. Thilmany and 
Barrett (1997) studied the implications of technical regulations for dairy exports from the 
United States within the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). In their 
approach, the shift in the demand curve reflects the effect of standards to alleviate 
consumer uncertainty about product quality, and the shift in the supply curve is due to 
increased transaction costs of export, including compliance costs. They compared 
domestic and international prices to estimate the producer subsidy equivalent and import 
tariff-rate equivalent of these trade barriers. Sumner and Lee (1997) explore the ways in 
which TBTs can impose costs at various stages of the marketing chain. They identify 
where in the food marketing chain SPS regulations, such as those intended to eliminate 
the risk of infestation, can impose costs. Their model is applied to regulations imposed by 
Asian importers on U.S. vegetables.  
 An illustration of the usefulness of the partial equilibrium multimarket approach is 
provided by the simple framework proposed by Overton, Beghin, and Foster (1995) in 
the case of the EU restriction on chemical residues in tobacco. The low EU restriction on 
residues of maleic hydrazide (MH) not only affects U.S. tobacco producers but also 
affects the U.S. and EU tobacco cigarette industries. The latter uses only a share of U.S. 
tobacco in its blend, for which the maximum residue is not a problem (MH contaminated 
U.S. tobacco is diluted with MH-free EU tobacco). A standard affects the relative 
composition of cigarettes, as far as origin of tobacco is concerned, and leads to greater 
costs for foreign producers. The partial equilibrium model makes it possible to take into 
account the substitution in demand (foreign and domestic tobacco are substitutes), as well 
as increases in production costs, and provides quantitative estimates of trade flows, rents, 
and welfare. While the model is quite simple, it shows some counterintuitive effects, for 
example, that if the regulation is non-binding for domestic manufacturers (because they 
use a low proportion of MH-contaminated tobacco), the residue regulation that is 
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protectionist in the tobacco output market can actually increase trade flows in the tobacco 
input market. Further, under a fixed U.S. production quota, the EU regulation could have 
a surprising anti-protective effect on EU growers. Surprisingly, U.S. cigarette 
manufacturers appear to have the most to gain from the EU regulation. 
Practical Validity of the Method  
 The work by Overton, Beghin, and Foster (1995) shows that even a simple two-
market model can provide useful estimates of the trade and welfare effects of regulations 
such as SPS or TBT measures. Even if one is reluctant to use economic assessments of 
the sanitary aspects (using relatively controversial methods such as the Cost of Illness, or 
the Value of a Statistical Life Saved; see Bowland and Beghin 2001 and OECD 1999a), 
such approaches make it possible to quantify the economic impacts. These economic 
impacts then can be compared with the effect of the measures on illness reduction, 
consumer valuation of SPS, or other process attributes.  
 With the ongoing research in the field of econometrics of product differentiation and 
imperfect competition, the gap between the stylized models derived from industrial 
organization and the applied partial equilibrium models is narrowing. This means that 
quantification of the trade and welfare effects of SPS and TBT regulations will be possible 
when taking into account more sophisticated mechanisms related to imperfect competition 
or consumer information in the future. This is clearly a promising area of research. 
 
Concluding Remarks: Setting a Research Program 
Focusing on the Policy-Relevant Issues 
 There are many disagreements between exporting countries and potential importers 
in OECD countries. Because the various issues refer to different empirical methods, 
defining a list of the most relevant empirical issues is a first step in setting a research 
agenda. In some cases, the issues at stake are mainly technical; countries disagree, for 
example, on the relevance of particular sanitary and phytosanitary standards, and these 
standards are seen as excessively restrictive by some exporters. Countries may also 
disagree on technical requirements and conformity assessments that impose costs on 
exporters. These issues are, in general, well known by trade negotiators (see USTR 2001; 
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European Commission 2000).10 Less is known about how severely the corresponding 
regulations constrain exports. Estimation of their actual effect on trade can rely on some 
of the methods described above (survey, price wedge, gravity, or spatial trade model 
approaches). Cost-benefit analysis may also help in identifying the costs of the 
regulations and assess whether they are in proportion to the externality they address, or 
whether they are mainly implemented for protecting domestic producers. These methods 
are relatively well known and their application is straightforward. 
However, the issues that involve cultural, ethical, or environmental aspects are the 
ones most likely to lead to severe disputes (Caldot and Vogel 2001). They are also the 
ones for which the multilateral framework is less adapted and for which analyses are 
most lacking.11 Research programs particularly should address the difficult cases where 
regulations affect trade and the protectionist component is unclear, but the program 
should also address the genuine concerns of consumers or citizens. This includes 
regulations that may be at odds with the existing agreements (for example, ones based on 
process and production methods and on an extensive conception of precaution, and ones 
that aim to protect global commons) and regulations that address concerns specific to a 
group of countries (animal welfare and acceptance of genetically modified organisms, for 
example). In such cases, it is necessary to address not only the trade effect but also the 
supply shift and demand effect of regulations. This requires less familiar and robust 
techniques for assessing the effect of regulation on consumers and citizens. 
Impact of Regulations on Existing Trade Flows 
 Technical regulations, such as those on the spreading of pests, on aflatoxins, on 
pesticide residues, and on the use of antibiotics, affect trade. While these measures might 
be legitimate, the amount of trade foregone is not always well known by decisionmakers. 
Combining gravity models or spatial trade models with econometric estimates is a 
potentially useful approach for identifying the role of regulations (as opposed to the 
“home bias,” i.e., the natural preference for trading with compatriots) in foregone trade. 
Recent developments suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop (2001), who introduce 
the concept of “multilateral resistance” (i.e., the more a country is resistant to trade with 
all other regions, the more it is pushed to trade with a given bilateral partner), and by 
Cheng and Wall (1999), who use a fixed-effects model for eliminating heterogeneity bias, 
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should make it possible to provide more interpretation of the border effect. The use of 
appropriate variables, some of them taken from inventory-based approaches, should help 
to unravel the various effects explaining trade foregone. In this area, the combination of 
different methods should surpass the usual literature in identifying the causes of the 
“border effect” and the role of regulations compared to other effects.12 
Impact of Regulations on Domestic and Foreign Firms 
 Minimum quality standards, mandatory labeling, and certification impose costs on 
would-be exporters. Even though these costs are not necessarily discriminatory (local 
producers face the same standards), this might lead to fixed (or sunk) costs. When a firm 
faces different standards in its own country, the costs of producing under two standards 
may lead it to specialize or to give up trade opportunities. This applies, for example, to 
controversial issues such as mandatory segregation of genetically modified (GM) and non-
GM crops in a particular country, the requirements of traceability in meat, compliance to 
animal welfare or environmental standards, or mandatory labeling in a country.  
A first step is to estimate the costs of regulations. This requires microeconomic, firm-
level approaches, surveys in the industry, and information from engineers. For many of 
these issues, regulations involve a set of standards (e.g., animal welfare and environmental 
standards in pig-meat production). An appropriate representation is the classical standard 
proposed by Rosen (1974). Production can be modeled by using a cost, profit, or supply 
function that includes discrete variables, so that the production costs increase with the 
standard if the standard is adopted. While econometric techniques exist for estimating 
dichotomic supply functions in a duality framework, research should focus on the 
possibility of calibrating simple functions that do not require sophisticated econometric 
procedures (on the basis of the framework described in Fisher and Serra 2000).  
The overall effects of the regulations may be relatively complex and counterintuitive, 
as shown by Overton, Beghin, and Foster (1995). This is particularly the case if they 
involve externalities. For example, the decision of allowing trade in GM crops imposes a 
cost of segregation for traders of standard crops that acts as an externality. It is not clear 
who is most affected by the regulation or what the overall impacts on trade would be, 
given that the regulation may also lead to product differentiation. Similar questions arise 
with animal welfare requirements. Dealing with these issues requires solving the puzzle 
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of calibrating models that are sophisticated enough to account for producers’ 
heterogeneity, for product differentiation, and for information effects. Calibration of 
supply and demand for vertically differentiated products (as in Flam and Helpman 1987) 
or for horizontally differentiated products (as in Stokey 1991) should make it possible to 
account for these phenomena in empirical applications. 
Impact of Regulations on Competitiveness of Third Markets 
 Simulations using trade models make it possible to assess the impact of a given 
regulation that hampers the competitiveness of the particular country that implements it. 
This approach could be used to assess the effects of SPS-related standards, but it also 
could assess new technical standards related to animal welfare and environmental 
management emerging in the European Union, the United States, Australia, and 
elsewhere (e.g., Beghin and Metcalfe 2000; Mitchell 2001). Given this rising presence of 
process standards in many OECD countries, it would be interesting to assess their impact 
on international competitiveness of these countries in third markets. An interesting case 
study would be the combination of animal welfare and environmental constraints in a 
sector such as pork. Several EU members and the United States compete in third export 
markets, for example, in pork markets in Asia. The accumulation of new standards may 
affect their competitiveness in these markets by raising their cost of production. Similar 
questions arise for the impact of regulations on GM organisms in the crop sector.  
Sectoral trade models are useful instruments for estimating the effects of these 
regulations. When there are large sectors affected by a regulation (e.g., entire grain or 
soybean exports affected by regulations on GM organisms, or entire exports of beef 
affected by sanitary restrictions), applied GE models can be useful.  
Valuation of Attributes and Information by Consumers 
 Because the most sensitive trade issues are the regulations that hamper trade while 
also involving genuine consumer (and citizen) concerns, there is a need for more research 
in valuing the positive effect of regulations that affect product attributes related to SPS 
and other TBTs. This includes health, animal welfare, veterinary standards, and 
environmental standards. The established approach of Mussa and Rosen (1978) has been 
used in hedonic studies and in analytical models of process attributes of goods (Nimon 
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and Beghin 1999a,b; Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina 1998). However, the willingness to 
pay for these attributes often is not distributed uniformly, as most often assumed in that 
approach. Based on the few studies available, most consumers agree to pay a small 
premium (often less than 10 percent) for these attributes, but very few are willing to pay 
much more than that. Hence, the distribution of consumers is not uniform over the quality 
spectrum. The other issue is the multiple dimension of the attribute space (sanitary, 
veterinary, several environmental, animal welfare). The approach should be able to 
aggregate these attributes into a valuation function in a consistent fashion. The logit 
model (Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse 1988, 1992, 1994) has potential and should be 
used as a foundation for the empirical investigation of consumers’ valuation of these 
attributes. Consumer surveys could elicit consumers’ valuation of these attributes, and 
panel regression techniques could be used to estimate the attributes’ value or lack of 
value. 
  
 
 
 
Endnotes 
1. This could involve an economic analysis similar to what is often used in competition policy, where 
non-competitive practices are sometimes seen as legitimate if they are welfare improving. This idea, 
suggested by the OECD (1999a), has been recently developed by Neven (2000).  
2. Deardorff and Stern (1998) show that one cannot hold the import price constant and isolate the effect 
on the NTB, unless world markets are infinitely elastic. There are several conceptual obstacles to 
summarizing the effect of an NTB as a scalar (e.g., a tariff equivalent) in a general case. The various 
components include the direct effect of NTBs on the quantity of imports; the change in elasticity of 
demand for imports, the variability of NTBs over time, and the uncertainty of NTBs. 
3. The database MAST compiled by UNCTAD and the data used by Ndayisenga and Kinsey (1994) are 
examples of such an inventory. The UNCTAD database on Trade Control Measures (TCM) also 
provides quantity controls such as automatic licensing, money and finance measures, price control 
measures, etc. The UNCTAD database relies on government notifications to GATT and the WTO.  
4. As an illustration, Barrett and Yang (1999) note that the U.S. Congressional Research Service found 
that only 17 out of the approximately 89,000 standards recognized in the United States had 
international origin in the whole set of industrial sectors (USHR 1989). This indicator of the lack of 
compatibility between U.S. and international standards suggests likely difficulties for potential 
exporters to the United States. However, it does not provide compelling evidence that trade is actually 
restricted by such standards. 
5. When they conducted interviews to complement the survey, Lux and Bureau found out that large-
sized firms in the European dairy industry did not mention foreign regulations as a major issue. These 
large firms have learned how to cope with existing barriers, especially in the United States, either by 
defining a particular range of product for this market (pasteurized cheese adapted to U.S. regulations) 
or by relocating production. Some even used this experience as a competitive instrument and were not 
keen on international actions for easing these barriers. 
6. Weyerbroeck and Xia (1998) and USGAO (1997) therefore expressed reservations on surveys, such 
as that of the USDA in 1996, when used for quantifications. 
7. For example, if a standard or its enforcement only raises cost (e.g., through delays in inspection or 
fees), it is inefficient for consumer protection and classifies as an NTB. 
8. Most of the costs borne by producers after the lifting of the U.S. ban on Mexican avocados, a ban that 
arose under high probability of infestation, come from the effect of free trade on domestic prices and 
not from the pest infestations (see Orden and Romano 1996). 
9. It is difficult to base sound economic analysis on estimates that are subject to controversies when the 
figures at stake are high: a general estimate has been made of U.S.$138 billion/year lost due to all 
invasive species—over 50,000—that have entered the United States (see Pimentel et al. 2000; and 
Mumford 2000). 
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10. Negotiators in developed countries consult with industry and work with them. In developing 
countries, basic information is lacking; however, The World Bank has included such works in its 
research agenda. See the ongoing program, “The Post-Seattle Agenda of the WTO in Standards and 
Technical Barriers to Trade: Issues for the Developing Countries,” currently under the responsibility 
of John S. Wilson at The World Bank. 
11. While the multilateral framework has been largely successful in addressing the most technical issues 
(most of them have been solved within formal panels), it has performed rather poorly when it has 
addressed regulations that had trade effects but that were largely the result of genuine concerns of 
citizens. For example, the tuna/dolphin GATT panels added a large number of people concerned 
about the environment to the ranks of the opponents of globalization. The 1997 hormones panel 
spread the belief that the goals of the WTO overshadowed the right of a democratically elected 
government to protect its consumers. 
12. For example, Head and Meyer (1999) find a significant decrease in the border effect in agriculture 
within the European Union in the 1990s but fail to identify the source—why the ending of the green 
rates and the monetary compensatory amounts obviously play a role. 
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